The European Union, by contrast, has long prided itself on normative power: wielding influence through commitment to international law, human rights, and ethical standards rather than by force. For example, the EU often conditions trade and aid on partners’ respect for fundamental values, implying that its influence depends on consistently upholding those norms.
The 2023 Israel–Gaza war has put Europe’s self-declared normative role to a stark test. EU leaders swiftly condemned Hamas’s cross-border attacks of 7 October 2023 and affirmed that Israel had the right to defend itself in line with international law. However, when Israel launched a massive military campaign in Gaza—including intense airstrikes, a ground invasion, and a blockade cutting off fuel, water, and aid—European statements became muted or circumspect. Critics argue that by hesitating to hold Israel accountable for alleged war crimes and atrocities in Gaza while continuing normal relations, Europe has undermined its credibility as a guardian of international norms.
This article examines the concept of Europe’s normative power and the legal commitments that accompany it. It then reviews Europe’s response to the Gaza conflict and evaluates the consequences for Europe’s moral authority and strategic influence.
Normative power in theory and practice
Normative power refers to the ability to shape international outcomes by setting standards and spreading norms rather than by force. The EU’s strategy of normative power was famously described by scholar Ian Manners: the EU claims strength from promoting values like human rights, democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. In practice, Europe often links its foreign policy and trade to these principles. Most EU partnership and association agreements contain “essential element” clauses making respect for fundamental values a precondition for cooperation. This reflects a post–World War II European identity built on multilateralism and legalism.
This approach stands in contrast to how other global powers project influence. The United States is the world’s foremost hard-power actor, with global military bases and control over key economic institutions. U.S. leaders may invoke democracy and human rights rhetorically, but strategic and security interests often take priority, and the United States is not a party to the International Criminal Court. Russia’s influence likewise rests on military might and energy or economic pressure, not on consistently promoting legal norms. China emphasizes economic inducements and bilateral deals, often insisting on non-interference and vetoing criticism of its own policies. In each case, power projection relies more on military or financial leverage than on international norms.
Europe’s main leverage is supposed to come from its normative appeal and its large economic market. Its influence depends on being seen as principled and even-handed. If the EU can credibly insist that international norms apply equally to all actors, states will take its diplomatic pressure seriously. Conversely, any sign of bias or hypocrisy quickly erodes that leverage. If Brussels condemns human rights abuses by some countries while excusing comparable abuses by others, observers will question the EU’s impartiality. In the realm of international law and human rights, credibility is everything. For example, the EU has in the past pushed other governments to respect the Geneva Conventions, hold war criminals accountable, and refrain from annexing territory. If Brussels now shows it will not apply those same rules to an ally, then its calls for compliance elsewhere will seem hypocritical. Observers note that when Europe blunts its own principles in one case, its ability to enforce them in others diminishes proportionally.
Europe’s normative stance has been one of its key assets in international diplomacy. Its ability to mobilize support for treaties and resolutions has often relied on the perception of consistency. However, the Gaza conflict has cast doubt on this reputation. If other states see EU leaders condemning human rights violations by some countries while excusing similar or worse abuses by Israel, they will inevitably question the EU’s impartiality. In such a scenario, Europe’s calls for adherence to international law—whether in conflicts across Asia, Africa, or elsewhere—will lose their persuasive force and moral credibility.
Europe’s international legal obligations
Europe’s claim to moral leadership is grounded in its binding commitments under international law, particularly in situations of armed conflict. In the context of the Gaza war, several key legal obligations apply to EU member states.
First, all EU countries are parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. Common Article 1 of the Conventions mandates states not only to respect but also to “ensure respect” for international humanitarian law (IHL) in all circumstances. These treaties explicitly prohibit attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, the starvation of non-combatants, the torture of protected persons, and the wanton destruction of property not justified by military necessity. Accordingly, EU states must neither participate in nor enable such violations when committed by any actor, including Israel. Second, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ratified by every EU member, imposes a clear and proactive obligation on states to prevent and to punish genocide.
This duty is not merely rhetorical; international legal doctrine holds that where there exists a credible risk of genocide, states must take all reasonable measures to stop it. The International Court of Justice, in its January 2024 ruling, determined that such a risk plausibly exists in Gaza, thus intensifying the responsibility of EU states to act accordingly. Third, under the United Nations Charter, to which all EU members are parties, there is a foundational prohibition against the acquisition of territory by force, enshrined in Article 2(4).
Israeli actions suggesting de facto or de jure annexation of territory in Gaza or the West Bank therefore directly conflict with these obligations. The ICJ’s advisory opinion issued in July 2024 reiterated that states must refrain from recognizing or legitimizing such annexation. Moreover, EU member states are compelled to comply with binding orders of the ICJ, including provisional measures aimed at preventing irreparable harm to protected populations. Finally, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ratified by all EU states except Denmark, imposes further obligations with respect to accountability for atrocity crimes.
This treaty grants the ICC jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and Articles 86 and 89 require states to fully cooperate with the Court, including executing arrest warrants. In November 2024, the ICC issued warrants for senior Israeli officials, citing alleged war crimes committed in Gaza. Under their legal commitments, EU countries are obligated to arrest these individuals should they enter EU territory and to support the ICC’s broader investigative and prosecutorial processes.
Taken together, these international legal frameworks place EU member states under a clear and comprehensive duty not only to refrain from complicity in unlawful acts but also to take meaningful steps to prevent, punish, and respond to violations—duties that remain conspicuously unmet in the context of the ongoing Gaza crisis.
Legal obligations under EU law
Beyond international treaties, the EU’s own legal framework reinforces these commitments. The EU–Israel Association Agreement (2000) explicitly designates respect for human rights and democratic principles as an “essential element” (Article 2). In practice, a breach of such an element justifies suspending or terminating the treaty. Therefore, if Israel’s conduct involves grave breaches of rights or IHL, EU law empowers member states to halt normal economic relations or impose sanctions.
The Agreement’s preamble further ties it to the UN Charter and affirms the EU’s commitment to international law. The ICJ’s July 2024 advisory opinion reinforced the obligation of states to distinguish between Israel and the occupied territories in their dealings. Accordingly, EU law should preclude actions that might legitimize annexation of occupied land—for instance, by restricting trade with settlements or ensuring that occupied territories are excluded from EU agreements.
EU member states have also ratified major human rights conventions, including the ICCPR, ICESCR, the Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. These treaties prohibit torture, discrimination, and arbitrary deprivation of life, while requiring adherence to due process. Documented mistreatment and killings of Palestinian civilians and detainees thus raise serious concerns about violations of these norms, which EU countries are legally bound to uphold.
Furthermore, the EU’s arms-export rules, particularly Common Position 2008/944, prohibit the transfer of military equipment where there is a clear risk it could be used to commit serious violations of IHL. In early 2024, UN human rights experts urged EU governments to suspend arms sales to Israel due to the escalating risk of atrocity crimes. While some countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands temporarily halted exports, the EU as a whole declined to adopt a collective embargo.
Altogether, European law binds member states to a high standard. They must not turn a blind eye when their partners commit serious abuses. Yet, by maintaining routine diplomatic and security relations with Israel amid credible allegations of war crimes, the EU has deviated from the principles enshrined in its own legal framework.
Europe’s response to the Gaza conflict
Europe’s actual response to the Gaza war has been widely criticized as one-sided. Following the 7 October 2023 attacks, EU leaders issued swift and unequivocal condemnation of Hamas and affirmed Israel’s right to self-defense in line with international law. However, as Israel’s military operations intensified, the EU’s rhetoric grew markedly cautious. Officials expressed concern over civilian suffering and called for humanitarian pauses but largely avoided naming Israel or attributing legal responsibility for alleged violations. In October 2023, for example, the European Council merely “regretted” civilian casualties without condemning Israel’s bombardment, instead framing the issue in terms of a collapsed ceasefire. This pattern of strongly criticizing one party while sparing the other has led many to conclude that the EU’s stance lacks neutrality.
Meanwhile, the EU continued its regular diplomatic engagement with Israel. Institutions resumed high-level dialogues, including the long-stalled EU–Israel Association Council in 2024, without attaching new conditions. Despite mounting evidence of human rights abuses, no EU member state imposed sanctions or invoked Article 2 of the Association Agreement. Military and arms cooperation persisted. Although countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain briefly halted some arms shipments, the majority continued supplying ammunition and related materials. Critics note that providing weapons to a state accused of indiscriminately bombing civilians—an act widely condemned in other contexts, such as the war in Ukraine—was nonetheless tolerated in this case.
Europe’s lenient treatment of Israel reflects a longstanding strategic partnership rooted in trade and security cooperation. Even as allegations of atrocities accumulated, Israel remained a routine diplomatic interlocutor. Analysts point out that if another state—particularly a non-Western one—had committed similar acts, the EU would almost certainly have responded with sanctions or suspensions. Israel’s exemption from such measures underscores the perception of double standards.
There were dissenting voices within the EU. In late 2023, the European Parliament passed resolutions condemning the civilian toll in Gaza and calling for targeted sanctions, including travel bans on Israeli officials implicated in serious abuses. Nevertheless, the EU Council and Commission effectively sidelined these proposals, opting instead to maintain their existing cautious approach.
The starkest display of inconsistency emerged around questions of legal accountability. In January 2024, South Africa filed a case at the ICJ accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza. The Court concluded that a plausible risk of genocide existed and issued provisional measures to protect Palestinian civilians. Despite their legal obligation to enforce these measures, EU states failed to press Israel or impose any consequences for noncompliance. Later that year, in November 2024, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Israeli leaders on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. While EU member states are obligated under the Rome Statute to arrest individuals indicted by the ICC, no government took steps to enforce the warrants. Diplomatic meetings with Israeli officials continued as usual, and one EU representative noted the irony that a high-level Association Council meeting would proceed despite the participants being under ICC indictment—an inconceivable situation had it involved other global figures.
Human rights groups denounced this disparity. Amnesty International criticized the EU’s “selective compassion,” highlighting its failure to condemn airstrikes that devastated entire Palestinian families. Human Rights Watch similarly called for Europe to unequivocally denounce atrocity crimes. Across the Global South, commentators and governments seized on the EU’s muted response as emblematic of Western double standards. The message was clear: if Europe is willing to overlook alleged genocide in Gaza, its broader advocacy for international law becomes deeply compromised.
Conclusion
Europe’s influence in world affairs has long depended on its credibility as a defender of international law and human rights. Yet, the Gaza conflict has revealed a troubling erosion of that credibility. By unequivocally supporting Israel’s right to self-defense while failing to address clear indications of war crimes and possible genocide, and by sustaining normal relations without meaningful accountability, the EU has weakened its claim to moral leadership. The contradiction between rhetorical commitment and practical inaction undermines Europe’s normative authority.
To restore its standing, Europe must realign its policies with its principles. This requires abandoning political exceptionalism and holding all actors, including Israel, to the same legal standards.
Ultimately, Europe’s strategic relevance rests on its moral consistency. If it continues to tolerate grave violations by favored allies, it will forfeit the authority it seeks to project. Conversely, by steadfastly upholding international law—without exception—it can rebuild trust, reclaim credibility, and preserve the normative power that once distinguished it as a principled global actor.
