Recently, extensive speculations have been made regarding China’s and Russia’s ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran, following the reactivation of the six Security Council resolutions. Three possible scenarios are examined below, and the most likely one is identified.
First Scenario: Establishment of strategic relations
What does a “strategic relationship” between Russia and China and the Islamic Republic of Iran mean?
It would mean that China begins large-scale investments in Iran, openly violates sanctions imposed by the West and the Security Council, and provides explicit security and diplomatic support for Iran in international organizations. Likewise, Russia would establish unity, cooperation, and military agreements with Iran, support it unconditionally at the Security Council, and at least in areas of shared interests, extend that support in international forums.
Assessment:
In reality, neither China nor Russia — now or in the foreseeable future — is prepared to form a genuine strategic alliance with Iran. Although many officials within the Islamic Republic have repeatedly referred to relations with these two countries as “strategic,” such relations have never truly existed.
While some Iranian analysts speak of Iran’s deep dependency on China and Russia, much of these claims and exaggerated assumptions are unrealistic and speculative. A strategic alliance with Russia could yield enormous benefits for Iran, but Russia does not seek such a relationship. Although a strategic alliance with China and Russia might increase tensions between Iran and the West, it could also strengthen Iran’s bargaining power. On the other hand, Iran might not even need such an alliance; at least in this respect, one could act as though it is unnecessary.
Second Scenario: Continuation of existing (tactical) support
The greatest risk China has so far accepted in its relations with Iran is purchasing oil, limited investment, and case-by-case, temporary, and selective support. Russia’s current support includes limited military cooperation, selective economic interaction, vetoes at the Security Council, and relative — but not extensive or unconditional — resistance to Western pressure.
Assessment:
At present and for the foreseeable future, neither China nor Russia is likely to exceed this level of support for the Islamic Republic of Iran. This degree of backing can, to a limited extent, help neutralize Western pressures on Iran. During this period, Iran should strive to expand economic and technological ties with China to benefit from the transfer of technology vital for national growth and development.
Over the past two decades, Iran has lost opportunities to absorb Chinese technology due to insufficient belief among industrialists — and perhaps even officials — in China’s technological capabilities. The more China advances technologically, the less willing it will be to transfer that technology. Iran must use the limited window of opportunity it has and integrate itself with China’s technological progress. The further China’s technological “bird” flies, the harder it becomes for Iran to fly alongside it.
Third Scenario: Significant decline in relations (and very limited support)
This situation may arise if the crisis between the Islamic Republic and the West reaches an uncontrollable level. China is very likely concerned about an all-out conflict between Iran and the West in West Asia and the Middle East, as the region plays a crucial role in meeting China’s energy needs for at least the next two decades. Russia is no less concerned than China about the massive presence of the U.S. and NATO in the region.
If this happens, China will significantly reduce its oil purchases from Iran and will probably adopt a neutral position in the Security Council. In this scenario, Russia will further distance itself from Iran and use it as a bargaining chip in negotiations to gain concessions from the West.
Assessment:
Many foreign policy experts believe that Russia constantly uses Iran as a tool to make deals and gain leverage over the West. Historically and fundamentally, Russia prioritizes its own interests and easily sacrifices others. Although these analysts and their concerns cannot be dismissed as illegitimate, viewing the foreign policy behavior of other countries as fixed and unchanging over time is somewhat pessimistic and exaggerated. Nevertheless, if this third scenario materializes, Iran’s isolation will be even greater than it is today.
Conclusion
The second scenario is currently the most probable one. This means that China and Russia will continue their selective and tactical support for Iran for now, and this cooperation will be limited to areas that serve their interests. When faced with the risk of heavy international costs, they will certainly retreat. In other words, expecting unconditional support from them — or imagining that all of Iran’s problems can be solved merely by relying on them — is unrealistic, just as ignoring these two powers would also be unwise.
