Its recent accession to BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), as well as its earlier integration into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), marks a deliberate recalibration of its international economic orientation—away from Western-dominated trade and financial networks toward a more diversified and inclusive global framework. This article explores how Iran’s expanding engagement with multipolar institutions may shape not only its own economic trajectory, but also influence the evolving architecture of the global economy. Drawing on theories from international relations and grounded empirical analysis, we examine the strategic, normative, and institutional dimensions of Iran’s shifting role.
Strategic autonomy and civilizational self-conception
Iran’s engagement with multipolar institutions is best understood through a Neoclassical Realist lens, which situates foreign policy within the dual context of international pressures and domestic constraints. Tehran’s pivot toward Eastern-led platforms reflects an effort to consolidate strategic autonomy in a geopolitically fluid environment. Simultaneously, a Constructivist interpretation highlights the ideational drivers behind Iran’s outreach—namely, its self-conception as a civilizational actor seeking to balance Western dominance. Together, these frameworks suggest that Iran’s strategy is motivated not only by material interests but also by normative and identity-based imperatives.
Decades of sanctions, financial isolation, and restricted access to global markets have challenged Iran’s economic development. In response, Tehran has adopted a dual-track strategy—engaging in negotiations (such as the JCPOA) while simultaneously broadening its partnerships with alternative economic and institutional frameworks.
Iran’s full entry into BRICS in 2024, following earlier inclusion in the SCO and active trade with the EAEU, represents more than symbolic alignment. It signals Iran’s intent to contribute to a more balanced international economic order and to reduce exposure to unilateral economic pressures. These affiliations provide Tehran with tools to enhance negotiating leverage while supporting structural shifts in global governance.
Mechanisms such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and proposals for a BRICS common currency offer new pathways for financial cooperation outside the traditional Western-led system. However, BRICS’ consensus-driven decision-making and internal divergences among member states may hinder operational coherence and timely policy implementation.
Iran’s effectiveness within this group will depend on its ability to align national objectives with broader BRICS development priorities, while navigating internal dynamics. Comparative analysis with countries such as Brazil and South Africa, which similarly seek to amplify Global South agency, illustrates both common ambitions and varying capacities. The pace at which BRICS can institutionalize credible alternatives to existing global financial instruments—such as SWIFT or the IMF—remains a key variable.
Beyond economic integration, Iran’s membership in the SCO provides a platform for security cooperation and infrastructure coordination. While the SCO’s economic mechanisms are less developed, its diplomatic utility lies in providing a forum for regional engagement, confidence-building, and participation in initiatives like China’s Belt and Road. Iran’s location and diplomatic posture also position it as a potential bridge between South, Central, and West Asia—especially if it can navigate intra-bloc rivalries such as those between China and India with strategic neutrality.
Compared to BRICS and the SCO, Iran’s relationship with the EAEU has yielded more immediate and tangible results. In 2024, bilateral trade reached $6.8 billion, with projections suggesting a 30%+ annual increase following the full implementation of the Free Trade Agreement in early 2025. These outcomes stem from preferential tariffs, harmonized customs systems, and joint ventures in agriculture, steel, and petrochemicals. Infrastructure developments, particularly the International North-South Transport Corridor, including the Rasht-Astara railway, have further solidified Iran’s position as a key regional transit hub.
The success of Iran’s multipolar strategy also depends on institutional readiness at home. While there is broad political support across factions for deeper engagement with Eastern platforms—often framed as a hedge against external economic pressure—maximizing the benefits of such partnerships requires regulatory reform, enhanced transparency, and stronger legal protections for foreign investors.
Public opinion adds another layer of complexity. While skepticism toward Western policies may fuel support for multipolarity, tangible economic improvements remain crucial to maintaining that support. Public confidence will ultimately hinge on results: lower inflation, job creation, and increased availability of goods and services. Without visible domestic dividends, external alignment may lose legitimacy.
A normative vision for a pluralist order
Iran’s multipolar turn is not merely reactive—it is also ideationally framed. Iranian officials often portray engagement with BRICS and the SCO as part of a broader civilizational project rooted in justice, equity, and respect for sovereignty and cultural diversity. This framing resonates with broader Global South narratives that call for a more inclusive and representative international system.
In this context, Iran seeks not only to join existing structures but to shape them from within. It positions itself as a contributor to a more equitable world order—one that challenges inherited hierarchies and promotes cooperative sovereignty. This vision allows Iran to act both as a participant and as a symbol of resistance to unipolar dominance.
Despite its potential, Iran’s multipolar engagement is not without risks. Overconcentration of relations within select blocs may narrow Tehran’s strategic flexibility—especially in the face of divergences or shifting priorities among partner states. Furthermore, deeper economic and technological collaboration with large powers such as China and Russia must be carefully calibrated to ensure reciprocal benefit and avoid structural imbalances.
Internal inefficiencies within BRICS and the SCO, geopolitical rivalries among key members, and broader global volatility present additional challenges. Fragmentation in the international system may also limit collective capacity to address global challenges such as climate change, public health, and cyber governance—areas that demand coordinated action beyond bloc politics. Iran must therefore remain vigilant in maintaining agency and avoiding overalignment in ways that could constrain its long-term options.
Conclusion: Strategic balance in a multipolar world
Iran’s expanded role in multipolar institutions reflects more than a tactical response to Western exclusion. It signifies a strategic reorientation grounded in both national interests and a normative vision for a more balanced global system. To translate these alignments into sustainable gains, Iran must pursue institutional reform, strengthen its domestic capacity for implementation, and remain agile in managing intra-bloc complexities.
Ultimately, Iran’s multipolar diplomacy is a forward-looking effort to remain relevant and resilient in a world where power is more diffuse, institutions more contested, and the global rulebook increasingly rewritten. Its success will depend not only on bold vision but also on careful calibration, good governance, and the ability to demonstrate that strategic pluralism can deliver meaningful outcomes at home and abroad.
