Avash News: Under these conditions, an old question has now been raised: “Based on which logic is Trump negotiating?” “What is seen from him is just personal chaos and moral instability, or is there a familiar pattern in international relations— a pattern that has been known as the Madman Theory for years?”
Under the logic of deterrence, particularly since the nuclear age, the main problem has been that many threats from a totally wise leader are not very believable because a wise leader knows that going to the end of the path will also have destructive results for themselves. Here, the act of being uncontrollable—or at least inducing such an impression—emerges.
New studies also show that “looking mad” can, in certain situations, make threats more believable. But the same studies warn at the same time that this strategy works only under limited conditions and is mostly ineffective, or it yields reverse results.
However, its modern form was articulated in the age of the Cold War with nuclear deterrence. Thomas Schelling and Daniel Ellsberg have each written differently about the effect of ambiguity, instability, and even the risk of situations going out of control in helping to make threats credible.
What later remained in the political memory of the US as the “Madman Theory” is more closely tied to Richard Nixon, the same president who, according to a famous narrative by H.R. Haldeman, wanted North Vietnam and the USSR to be convinced that he might become so angry and uncontrollable that he would press the nuclear button. This memory from Haldeman entered US political literature.
But there was a fundamental problem: if the other party does not believe that this “madness” is real, the threat will lose its effectiveness. And if they do believe it’s real, why should they be sure that after giving a concession, stability will be established?
In the Nixon case, despite alerting operations and attempts to send the message of being a “madman,” neither Hanoi was frightened nor did Moscow retreat. The gap between Trump and Nixon begins here. In Nixon’s case, “looking mad” was a calculated role. With Trump, many analysts argue that the situation is more complicated. He doesn’t just play this role— for many international players, he himself is the madman.
Roseanne W. McManus, in an article published in January 2025 in Foreign Affairs, wrote that the main problem is that the “Madman” strategy has a chance of success when instability is limited, has a subject, and is controllable to some extent. In such cases, the threat may be scary, but the agreement will also become less credible.
It must be noted that Trump did not come from a bureaucratic machine or the US diplomatic tradition. He is a product of the real estate world, media spectacle, and the culture of violent trade contests.
The question is: Why is Trump’s model in the case of Iran more destabilizing than it is deterrent? Perhaps the story begins from the same point where the Madman Theory reaches dangerous borders, where “fear” does not lead to “certainty.” On the contrary, it turns into “chronic mistrust.”
